Measuring Competition

The most interesting aspects of school choice, to me, are the outcomes associated with traditional public schools near newly opened “schools of choice.” School choice was a fairly alien topic to me until graduate school. I grew up in a town with one high school and the only school of choice was a Catholic grade school. I am likely primarily interested in the effects of how the competition generated by schools of choice change (or do not change) traditional public schools due to the fact that my experiences as a student in primary, secondary, undergraduate, and graduate school and my experiences as a teacher have all been in public schools. Moreover, despite the focus of the media, policy-makers, and researchers, schools of choice are, and will remain, a small segment of the educational landscape.

Through reading the literature on the effects of competition, I was surprised to learn the wide range of findings associated with the effects of competition. In summary, studies have found that school competition may improve[i], impair[ii], or have no effect[iii]  on traditional public schools. Through examining these studies, it became clear that while all of the studies claim to examine the effects of competition, a wide range of measures and methods are being used to define competition.

Thus, the problem. Educational researchers are seeking to answer questions and inform policy makers about issues surrounding school choice, but without agreed definitions and consistent measures, researchers will likely continue to find conflicting evidence. This problem is not exclusive to competitive effects, or even school choice, but it continues to be a problem nonetheless. Obviously educational programs and policies do not exist in a vacuum and solutions of chemistry or physics do not translate to studies of school choice, but how can educational researchers build an evidence base with a foundation that includes common definitions and measures?

I do not seek to answer this question here, but to start a conversation that may one-day result in answers. What are your thoughts? What is the next step? Is this even a problem?

by Matt Linick

Bettinger, E. P. (2005). The effect of charter schools on charter students and public schools. Economics of Education Review, 24(2), 133-147. Doi:10.1016/j.econedurev.2004.04.009

Bifulco, R., & Ladd, H. (2006). The impacts of charter schools on student achievement: Evidence from North Carolina.  Education Finance and Policy, 1(1), 50-90. Doi:10.1162/edfp.2006.1.1.50

Bohte, J. (2004). Examining the Impact of Charter Schools on Performance in Traditional Public Schools. The Policy Studies Journal, 32(4), 501-520.

Booker, K., Gilpatric, S. M., Gronberg, T., & Jansen, D. (2008). The effect of charter schools on traditional public school students in Texas: Are children who stay behind left behind? Journal of Urban Economics, 64(1), 123-145. Doi:10.1016/j.jue.2007.10.003

Buddin, R. J., & Zimmer, R. W. (2005). Is charter school competition in California improving the performance of traditional public schools?. RAND.

Carr, M., & Ritter, G. (2007). Measuring the competitive effect of charter schools on student achievement in Ohio’s traditional public schools. Research Publication Series, National Center for the Study of Privatization in Education, Teachers College, Columbia University. Retrieved November 24, 2007.

Holmes, G. M., DeSimone, J., & Rupp, N. G. (2003). Does school choice increase school quality? (No. w9683). National Bureau of Economic Research.

Hoxby, C. M. (2003). School choice and school productivity: Could school choice be a tide that lifts all boats? In C. Hoxby (Ed.), The Economics of School Choice (pp. 287-342). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Imberman, S. A. (2007). The effect of charter schools on non-charter students: An instrumental variables approach. University of Houston.

Imberman, S.A. (2011). The effect of charter schools on achievement and behavior of public school students. Journal of Public Economics 95,(2011), 850-863. Doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.02.003

Ni, Y. (2009). The impact of charter schools on the efficiency of traditional public schools: Evidence from Michigan. Economics of Education Review, 28(2012), 571-584. Doi:10.1016/j.econedurev.2009.01.003

Sass, T. (2006). Charter schools and student achievement in Florida. Education Finance and Policy, 1(1), 91. Doi:10.1162/edfp.2006.1.1.91

Winters, M. (2012). Measuring the effect of charter schools on public school student achievement in an urban environment: Evidence from New York City. Economics of Education Review, 31(2012), 293-301. Doi:10.1016/j.econedurev.2011.08.0

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[i]  (Bohte, 2004; Booker et al., 2008; Holmes, DeSimone, & Rupp, 2003; Hoxby, 2003; Sass, 2006; Winters, 2012)

[ii] (Bettinger, 2005; Carr & Ritter, 2007; Imberman, 2007; Ni, 2009)

[iii] (Bifulco & Ladd, 2006; Buddin & Zimmer, 2005)

The Revolving Door of School Leadership in Charter Schools

Despite the continuous bipartisan support of charter schools, scholars have not reached a consensus on whether charter schools improve student learning. As empirical research continues to demonstrate, building effective schools is more complex than simply introducing autonomy and competition.

According to research (see a study by The Wallace Foundation), principal leadership is second only to teaching among all school-related factors that influence student learning, explaining about one-quarter of all school effects. Given the importance of principal leadership, a growing number of studies have shown that principal turnover matters for schools’ organizational capacities and student learning. Although principal turnover may be desirable if it brings about better principal-school matches and the infusion of more effective practices into schools, high principal turnover is likely to have negative effects on student outcomes, due to loss of school institutional memory, high training costs for new principals, increased teacher turnover, and inconsistencies in school policy, goals, and culture.

As we turn our attention further to principal leadership, now seems an important time to consider the status and impact of principal turnover. To this end, I think it is worthy to consider whether charter schools have higher or lower principal turnover rates than regular public schools. On one hand, an individual is often attracted to leadership in a charter school because of the school’s unique mission. The alignments between principals and school missions are likely to promote principal commitment and retention. On the other hand, as research indicates, charter school principals, compared to their peers at regular public schools, tend to have less administrative experience in schools, less teaching experience, and are less likely to hold at least a master’s degree. Such attributes are often associated with increased likelihood of turnover.

Compared to principals in regular schools, charter school principals tend to have substantially more autonomy over internal issues such as hiring and retaining effective teachers, firing those perceived as ineffective, establishing professional learning communities, and allocating resources to facilitate innovation in instruction. This high level of flexibility and autonomy is expected to result in high job satisfaction, and make principals more likely to stay in their current positions. However, since charter school principals assume many responsibilities, some of which are the same as a district superintendent, a heavier and different workload for charter school principals may increase the risk of “burnout” and turnover.

So far, empirical evidence has shown that charter schools have higher principal turnover than regular public schools. A report from the U.S. Department of Education analyzed data from the Schools and Staffing Survey in 2007-08 and its follow-up survey and showed that 28% of principals in charter schools left their positions, compared to 20% in regular public schools. In Utah, the average annual turnover rate between 2004 and 2010 was 26% in charter schools compared to 20% in regular schools. A report from the New York City Charter School Center shows that average annual principal turnover from 2005-06 to 2010-11 was at least 18.7% for NYC charter schools, compared to at least 3.6% across district schools. In another study conducted by the Center on Reinventing Public Education, 71% of 400 charter school leaders surveyed indicated that they expected to leave their current jobs within five years, and many felt they were struggling in their current schools.

Where do principals go after leaving? Research indicates that regular school principals are often former teachers who desire career advancement within the educational system. The experience of leading a school may serve as a “stepping stone” along a recognized career path. In addition, there are many opportunities for regular school principals to move between schools. HoweverOn the other hand, it is harder for charter school principals to move between charter schools, as they might not “fit” in other mission-driven charter schools. They are also less likely to move to a regular school because of limited credentials and less professional experience in education. Furthermore, there is no known career path for charter school principals within the education system. In this sense, the charter school principal position is likely to be regarded as a “stopping point” instead of a “stepping stone.”

The assumptions about different principal movement patterns between charter and regular schools have been tentatively supported by analysis of Utah data. Among all principals who left Utah charter school positions between 2004 and 2010, 44% changed to non-principal positions within the Utah educational system, 46% left the Utah public school system altogether, and only 10% took principal positions at other schools. In contrast, among all principals who left regular school positions, 50% moved to another school and remained a principal, 25% changed to a non-principal position, and 25% left the system, mostly by retiring. If these patterns hold in other states—most charter school principals change to non-principal positions after leaving—then the charter school sector will face overall principal shortages. This a very significant problem because new charter schools open up every year and need new principals.

Charter schools are vulnerable to high rates of principal turnover because most charter schools are mission-driven, which makes it harder to recruit candidates with the right “fit.” Also, leading a charter school requires many of the same skills as a district superintendent or a CEO. Thus, appropriate preparation programs that target these needs, better working conditions, incentives, sustained professional development, and appropriate peer networks and peer mentoring are recommended to improve principals’ effectiveness and reduce principal turnover in charter schools.

by Yongmei Ni

Policy Interventions or Political Posturing?

National Journal posed the following question, to which Forum Director Chris Lubienski responds:

House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, R-Va., last Friday visited a private Catholic school, St. Mary's Academy in New Orleans, for a tour and a discussion with local education officials and families. The purpose of the visit, (gumbo and sazerac aside) was to promote Louisiana Gov. Bobby Jindal's education agenda, much of which has landed in court. "We want to explore what has been gained in terms of experience to see how we can learn from this at the federal level," Cantor said after the event.

Jindal, a rising star in the Republican party, last year announced an ambitious education plan for Louisiana that has been cheered by school choice advocates and booed by teachers' unions. The plan forms a virtual battleground for a difficult education debate in a state whose schools are ranked among the very worst in the country. Louisiana is the perfect place for radical school proposals, and Jindal doesn't shy away from the task. His plan includes private school vouchers, severely weakened teacher tenure, and fast-tracking for charter schools.

Last week, a Louisiana court threw out Jindal's teacher tenure evaluation measure, saying it violated the state constitution because it contained too many unrelated provisions. Late last year, the same court said the voucher program was unconstitutional because it diverted local tax dollars to private schools.

Jindal is unbowed by the setbacks. "When we embarked on this path of reform, we knew this would not be an easy fight because the coalition of the status quo is entrenched and has worked to hold Louisiana teachers and students back for decades," he said in response to the most recent court ruling.

American Federation of Teachers President Randi Weingarten cheered the ruling, saying elected officials can't force radical changes on the education system without consultation and deliberation. The court decision "should be a wake-up call to so-called reformers determined to ram through top-down dictates that undermine the voice of educators and public schools at all costs," she said.

What does Jindal's plan--and Cantor's interest in it--signify about Republicans' views on education? What is the impact on the public school system from school choice initiatives like Jindal's? What is the impact of eliminating the benefits of teacher tenure? Is it a direct attack on the teachers unions? Where can Democrats find common ground with Republicans in this conversation?

Dr. Lubienski's response:

Poor John White.  The Louisiana Superintendent’s efforts to do right (at least in his mind) by the state’s school children has earned him substantial credibility with the current crop of education reformers around the country.  But he also serves a governor who seems more intent on positioning himself with the right-wing of the GOP for a presidential run than on having a lasting beneficial impact on education in the Bayou state.

His boss, Governor Bobby Jindal has been causing quite a commotion, in the schools and in the courts.  He has tried to deepen and accelerate the market-oriented reforms that proliferated in post-Katrina New Orleans, expanding them across the state.  Jindal’s plan for education reform has a number of elements, but centers on:

·       expanding Louisiana’s voucher program statewide to students at more public schools

·       growing the supply-side by inviting more groups (including businesses) to provide education services

·       opening up more opportunities for “high quality charter operators” with “proven track records” to get established (so much for the local, independent “mom-and-pop” start-ups)

·       and, of course, cultivating a teacher labor market by undercutting tenure and salary scales, giving more authority to employers, and tying teachers’ value to students progress.

But then a Republican-appointed judge throws out the tenure reforms on a technicality, and rules that the voucher program undercut local control of public education resources. 

Is that a problem for the Jindal education agenda?  Hardly.  After all, the point isn’t to get these things implemented in order to improve the education of Louisiana kids.  Indeed, there’s precious little clear and compelling evidence that things like vouchers, monetary incentives for teachers, or even charter schools necessarily raise achievement for students (consider the continuing widespread failure in RSD), much less that scaling-up even these programs will work with a wider population. 

Instead, the Jindal education agenda appears to be more about positioning the governor as the standard bearer for ALEC-inspired education reforms, probably in preparation for a run for national office where he’ll need the support of influential and well-heeled conservative groups.  In that sense, it doesn’t matter if these measures “work,” or even if they’re implemented, but only that his proposals demonstrate superior commitment to the cause of attacking unions and elevating market mechanisms.

In that regard, Eric Cantor’s recent visit was likely to produce more in the way of political insights into Jindal’s electability than any policy insights into the efficacy of these programs. 

Meanwhile, as the political circus proceeds through Baton Rouge, and his boss engages in political posturing, John White has a lot of kids in need of a better education.

Replicating failure – John Banks and charter schools

The following blog was originally posted at The Daily Blog, and was written by John Minto.

“charter schools are not about raising student achievement but are a political response to a corporate problem – how can we get into public education and make private profit from government spending?”

Friday’s announcement by Act leader and Associate Education Minister John Banks of the Board which will select successful charter school applicants raises two important issues.

Firstly the appointment of the board and its announcement was premature – a slap in the face for parliament which has not yet even heard from the select committee considering the proposal, let alone passed legislation enabling these schools to be established. Fellow Act Party member and chair of the Charter School Working Group Catherine Isaacs did something similar late last year when she used her position to call for expressions of interest in running charter schools despite the select committee having not heard even the first submission.

The second issue relates to the makeup of this John Banks Board. There is not a single person on this group who has a track record of improving educational achievement for children from low-income communities despite the fact this is the very group the government says it wants to target with charter schools.

This is not surprising because charter schools are not about raising student achievement but are a political response to a corporate problem – how can we get into public education and make private profit from government spending?

But before we condemn charter schools out of hand we must ask the key question – do they raise education achievement? The answer is a resounding NO. Every country which has gone down the charter school path – the US, UK and Sweden were held up as examples by Act – has seen its education system go backwards in international comparisons such as through PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment).

In the last PISA tests in 2009 New Zealand was 7th in reading, 13th in maths and 7th in science – well ahead of any of the charter school countries. The US was 17th, 31st and 33rd, the UK 26th, 28th and 16th and Sweden 20th, 26th and 29th respectively of the 65 countries who took part – including all OECD countries.

These charter school countries have slipped in the rankings despite two decades of letting the private sector into their education systems. “Epic fail” would not be too strong to describe their educational performance. Charter schools have led these education systems to become fragmented and incoherent and the horror stories are thick on the ground.

Mismanagement, lack of accountability, poorly resourced classrooms, untrained, unqualified teachers on low pay and poor educational achievement are the norm.

After 20 years of charter schools in the US the most comprehensive study showed just 17% of charter schools outperforming public schools, 37% performed worse than public schools and the rest showed no difference. The high achievers either had selected intakes or sophisticated ways of expelling less academically able students. In KIPP school for example – another example paraded by ACT – 40% of African American boys “drop out” before they reach 8th grade (Year 9 in NZ)

John Banks wants the worst features of charter schools here. Untrained and unqualified teachers are essential to the private sector because they are cheaper and this allows for greater profits to be stripped from the schools. Being exempt from the Official Information Act and Ombudsman as Banks wants also means we will never know the true extent to which we and our kids are being ripped off.

Instead of mimicking failure we should emulate successful countries like Finland whose PISA results were 3rd, 6th and 2nd respectively. No charter schools in Finland – just a heavily resourced and very high quality public education system. That’s what we need here.

The government has made much of the “long tail of underachievement’ in New Zealand’s education system where children from low-income families (including disproportionate numbers of Maori and Pacifika children) achieve poorly at school. We do have a longer tail than some countries but our poorest performers still do much better than the poorest performers in most surveyed countries.

More importantly though our long tail of underachievement is in fact our long tail of poverty and inequality – a situation created by the neo-liberal free market policies which ACT, National and Labour foisted upon the country from 1984.

Reversing these policies will be an important part of raising student achievement for the children of the poor.

Worth a Read: Educational Delusions? Why Choice can Deepen Inequalities and How to Make Schools Fair

Gary Orfield and Erica Frankenberg of the Civil Rights Project at UCLA have collaborated once again on a weighty book, one that looks at the civil rights implications of choice.  Just published this month by University of California Press it makes a central contribution to the policy analysis field.

I will give more space to selected excerpts here than I will consume with my own observations.  Two facets of the book I would highlight, however, are that it includes important new empirical studies, and also that it is not anti-charter and choice.  Indeed, the authors provide many examples throughout the book of ways that choice has always held integrative potential, and still does – if policymakers pay careful attention.  

The authors write:

Our intent was to produce a volume that would be accessible and based on clear evidence, to help readers critically assess assumptions about school choice and the civil rights implications of the choices and decisions being made in their communities. Because much of the debate in this arena is ideologically driven, we grounded our examination in specific cases as a way to illustrate the relationships between policies and their effects on segregation and opportunity for poor and minority families, evidence from which readers could draw their own conclusions about school choice (pp. ix-x).

The authors have largely achieved this goal.  One chapter that ought to be assigned reading for education law and policy students, by Erica Frankenberg and Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, focuses on the lack of directives at the state level to regulate charter school segregation levels.  In the absence of clear federal policies about preventing segregation in charters that receive federal funding, states also feel little pressure to enact such policies.  This is not only a dereliction of responsibility, but a missed opportunity:

Aside from diversity requirements and nondiscrimination obligations, there are other, seemingly race-neutral decisions about charter schools that could have significant consequences for their ability to attract a diverse student enrollment. For instance, the lack of legislation extending charter transportation across district lines undercuts one of the sector’s integrative strengths: the opportunity to attract a diverse student body across such boundaries. Since most school segregation today exists between districts, charters represent an important opportunity to override the lines dividing school systems. (p. 134)

Case studies from Louisville, Hartford, and Berkeley show such integrative possibilities and explain the policy tools used to achieve them (i.e. controlled choice, magnets, and use of planning zones), while Amy Stuart Wells and colleagues update what is known about the outcomes of inter-district transfer programs.  A recurring theme throughout is that parents are still eager for diverse schools for their children, as evidenced by competitive admissions for many urban-suburban interdistrict plans, and demand that exceeds supply for magnets in just about every metropolitan area. 

Barus Gumus-Dawes, Tom Luce, and Myron Orfield of the Institute for Race and Poverty make a sound contribution to the gridlocked debate about charter school outcomes in New Orleans, which ought to be read widely -- but probably will not be.  First, they examine achievement data to show that the achievement differences among sectors – Recovery School District (RSD), Orleans Parish Schools, and suburban schools – outweigh those between RSD charters and the city’s regular public schools.  In the RSD, the authors write, “charters can use admission requirements, enrollment processes, discipline and expulsion practices, transportation policies, location decisions, and marketing or recruitment efforts to shape their student bodies clearly implies that selection bias is almost certainly working to make pass rates in charters, all else being equal, greater than those of traditional schools” (p. 175).  They encourage a consideration of the use of magnet schools as an addition to the current almost exclusive focus on charters.  Also viable, they write, would be to explore a regional plan, similar to Raleigh’s or Louisville’s:

 “In 2009 there were three times as many students in suburban public schools as in the city system. The racial and income mix of the full regional school system clearly provides much more potential for integration efforts than the city alone. An effective regional system would also likely fare better in competition with the private system than the city alone” (p. 179).  If, that is, there are constituencies left there who would embrace higher levels of integration as a goal.  With Governor Jindal’s private-school voucher plan newly expanded, discussions of racial segregation aren’t particularly lively in Louisiana, unless you are a federal judge noting that it interferes with a standing desegregation order. 

I will give Gary Orfield the last word about the application of market incentives, unfettered, to public schools.  He writes in his chapter entitled “Choice Theories and the Schools”:

Getting the best results from competition requires enforcement of the rules of the game by government. When one uses the promise of private gains as the basic engine of change, one must channel that great force to produce real gains and limit harm. The drive for profits is a powerful motivator, and if it is possible to get more while doing less by cheating, the market will be corrupted…It is ironic that the same ideology that assumes people are inherently inclined toward evil and corruption in politics and therefore need to be watched and limited somehow believes that people in markets are not subject to the same temptations. What we see in many discussions of school choice is a school produced by an ideal type of market instead of the real situation facing the most disadvantaged schools.  (p.47)

Lesson learned: Federales necessarii sunt.  Federal regulation is not the answer to every problem in education, but in this case, some ground rules desperately need clarification and enforcement.   

By: ElizabethDeBray